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Abstract 
This paper investigates the long-term effects on immigrant earnings and em-
ployment from labor market conditions encountered upon arrival. We find sub-
stantial effects both of the state of the national labor market and of local unem-
ployment rates. Comparing refugees entering Sweden in a severe and unex-
pected recession to refugees arriving in a preceding economic boom, we at-
tempt to handle the issue of selective migration. The analysis of effects at the 
local level exploits a governmental refugee settlement policy to get exogenous 
variation in local labor market conditions. 
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IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  2 1 Introduction 
Immigrants on average perform worse than natives in the labor markets of most 
Western countries (OECD 2001). This has caused researchers to search for ex-
planations to the gap between immigrants and the native population, and to dif-
ferences across immigrant groups. On the latter topic, some studies have con-
sidered the possibility that labor market conditions at the time of immigration 
may have a long-term impact on earnings and employment. 
There are two basic aspects of this issue. First, do cohorts arriving in a time 
of good prospects in the national labor market fare better compared to immi-
grants arriving in a time of bad prospects? Second, does the long-term success 
differ between people who arrive at the same time, but encounter different local 
labor market conditions? 
If there is a negative effect on people immigrating during economic down-
turns, governments may opt to adjust immigration and/or integration policies 
over the business cycle. Many European countries use some type of policy to 
control the initial location of certain immigrant groups (Dutch Refugee Council 
1999). If there proves to be a long-term effect of which type of local labor mar-
ket one initially stays in, governments would probably like to focus their set-
tlement policies on regions with favorable labor market conditions. It is also 
well-documented that immigrants at least in part base their location decisions 
on factors other than the properties of the labor market, such as the presence of 
other immigrants.
1 The earnings and employment consequences of this behav-
ior becomes a policy concern if society values labor market success higher than 
the individual, or if location decisions are based on incomplete information 
about the impact of local conditions. 
Previous empirical investigations have focused on the first issue: does the 
state of the national labor market matter? A limitation in these studies is that 
they have been unable to control for the fact that individual decisions on when 
and where to migrate may be influenced by labor market conditions in the host 
country. If the composition of immigrants arriving to a certain country in reces-
sions differs from the composition of the inflow in better times, this may create 
a misleading picture of how initial labor market conditions affect individuals. 
                                                      
1 This is confirmed by several studies, including Bartel (1989) and Zavodny (1999) for the US, 
and Åslund (2001) for Sweden. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  3 We use Swedish data on refugees immigrating between 1987 and 1991 to 
investigate these issues. Studying this group of immigrants has several advan-
tages. Refugees are likely to be less responsive to the state of the labor market, 
since push rather than pull factors are behind their migration. Furthermore, the 
cohorts we study made the decisions to migrate under similar labor market ex-
pectations, so any selection on host country characteristics should go in the 
same direction in all the included cohorts.
2 A dramatic increase in unemploy-
ment in the early 1990s created a situation where the included refugee cohorts 
met radically different labor markets. Those immigrating in 1987 spent up to 
four years in a good labor market, whereas the 1991 cohort met unprecedented 
levels of unemployment during their first years in Sweden. 
In the analysis of the second question, we exploit a refugee settlement pol-
icy pursued by the Swedish government during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The policy meant that people were not free to choose their initial location in the 
country, and provides a source of exogenous variation to study the impact of 
initial local labor market conditions. Since we have cross-sectional variation 
under very different national labor markets, we also get a picture of whether 
initial locations matter more in a boom or in a recession. 
Why could initial labor market conditions matter in the long run? One the-
ory is that poor prospects increase the probability of unemployment, which in 
turn leads to long-term “scars”. Scarring can be a problem if, for example, em-
ployers use past unemployment as a signal on low productivity, or if time out 
of employment leads to skill losses. Several recent studies find evidence for 
this type of state dependence; see e.g. Arulampalam et al. (2000), Arulampalam 
(2001), Gregg (2001), and Gregory & Jukes (2001) for the UK, and Hansen & 
Lofstrom (2001) for immigrants in Sweden.
3 
Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) show that conditions at the time of entry on the 
labor market can matter for a long time if there is imperfect job mobility among 
the workers. In their model, the existence of a relocation cost gives employers 
the opportunity to hold down wages for those who entered at a low wage level. 
Costs of geographic mobility can also affect the impact of local conditions. If 
                                                      
2 Agreeably, refugees can choose which country to go to. If conditions in Sweden changed rela-
tive to other alternatives, the selection process could differ across the studied cohorts. We will re-
turn to this issue in section 4 with a presentation of some facts indicating that this is not likely to 
be a major problem. 
3 Ellwood (1982) is an early study of the scarring phenomenon. Steiner (2001) rejects the hy-
pothesis of unemployment persistence in an investigation using data for West Germany. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  4 starting out in a persistently bad location means a greater probability to be liv-
ing there also after some period of time, this could be a mechanism through 
which initial exposure to poor conditions is associated with less success in the 
labor market. 
Previous research that has focused on the conditions at entry does not give a 
clear message on the existence of long-term effects. Some studies find a nega-
tive impact that lasts for at least some time; see e.g. Chiswick & Miller (2002) 
on earnings among US immigrants. Other results for the US actually suggest 
that entering in a time of high unemployment could be associated with higher 
probabilities of individual employment (Chiswick et al. 1997). Similarly, 
McDonald & Worswick (1999) find that people immigrating to Australia dur-
ing high unemployment experience faster earnings assimilation.
4 None of these 
studies deal with the issue of selective migration.
5 
Our results suggest that both national and local conditions matter for several 
years. Entering in a labor market recession decreases the chances of employ-
ment and lowers earnings during the observation period (5–7 years after immi-
gration). Meeting poor local conditions has a clear impact on earnings and em-
ployment for at least ten years. There are indications that initial local condi-
tions matter not only through an increased probability of remaining in a persis-
tently bad location: initial unemployment rates appear to affect outcomes also 
when controlling for contemporary local unemployment. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview 
of refugee migration to Sweden, the government placement policy for refugees, 
and the rise in unemployment during the 1990s. Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 contains the empirical analysis. We first use methods along the lines 
of previous studies to relate Sweden to other countries. Then we go on to our 
main results, beginning at the national level and then proceeding to the local 
level. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                      
4 MacDonald & Worswick (1998) report a negative but insignificant relation between the unem-
ployment rate at entry and earnings for immigrant men in Canada. Nakamura & Nakamura 
(1992) report lower current wages for immigrants who entered the US or Canada under high na-
tional unemployment. Stewart & Hyclak (1984) find higher earnings among people who immi-
grated to the US during high annual GNP growth. 
5 Note that the inconclusive results in these studies do not necessarily indicate an absence of scar-
ring effects among immigrants, since they do not directly analyze the issue of scarring. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  5 2 Background 
Our empirical approach builds on two sources of variation that we argue can be 
treated as exogenous: the governmental refugee settlement policy and the 
Swedish economic crisis of the early 1990s. This section gives some back-
ground on these issues. 
Figure 1 shows the development of refugee immigration and annual unem-
ployment rates. In the later part of the 1980s the Swedish economy was experi-
encing a boom with low and falling levels of unemployment. In 1990 unem-
ployment began to rise from below two percent, reaching the unprecedented 
level of ten percent in 1993. Employment in both the private and the public 
sector decreased (Lundborg 2000). As a matter of fact, industrial employment 
began to fall already in the later part of 1989, and so did the vacancy rate. 
The figure also shows that refugee immigration increased rapidly during the 
1980s, with a peak of around 25,000 residence permits in 1989. After a small 
downturn in the first years of the 1990s, there was a new, and much higher, 























Figure 1 National unemployment (percentage of labor force) and the number of 
residence permits granted to refugees, 1985–2001. 
Source: The Labor Market Board and the Swedish Migration Board. 
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policy
6 
In 1985 the Swedish government implemented a new refugee reception system 
containing two new major elements: municipal placement of refugees and an 
extensive introduction period. Under this policy the typical refugee arrived to 
Sweden, applied for asylum, and then stayed in a refugee center in anticipation 
of a residence permit. 
The placement policy was a reaction to the geographic concentration of new 
immigrants, where some municipalities in metropolitan areas thought they took 
an unfair share of the burden of immigration. The policy meant that refugees 
were not free to choose where to reside initially, but were assigned to a mu-
nicipality by the government after being given residence permits. There were, 
though, no restrictions against relocating if the refugees could find a place on 
their own. The placement system was in reality viable during the period 1985–
91, and a vast majority of the refugees were placed by the government. In the 
years 1987–91 the figure was about 90 percent. Beginning in 1992, the system 
collapsed under heavy immigration from former Yugoslavia. Formally, it was 
in place to 1994, however. 
At first the idea was to put people in municipalities that provided good op-
portunities for work or education. Over time, a focus on small locations and the 
advantages of their presumed closeness between natives and immigrants 
evolved. In practice, available housing became the deciding factor, as this was 
a scarce factor in many cities during the boom of the late 1980s. As immigra-
tion soared, almost all municipalities became involved in the reception: 277 out 
of 284 municipalities had an agreement with the Immigration Board in 1989, 
compared to the original idea of 60 reception locations. 
Edin et al. (2002 & 2003) argue that the municipal placement can be re-
garded exogenous, conditional on observed characteristics of the individual. 
For example, people of some nationalities were more likely to end up in certain 
locations than others, but there was no interaction between municipal place-
ment officers and refugees.
7 Similar to those studies, we use the placement pol-
                                                      
6 This section draws primarily on Edin et al. (2002 & 2003). 
7 This means that selection into different locations was based solely on observed characteristics. 
Level of education was a factor for selection, since municipal officers tried to cream-skim among 
refugees. Also, singles were less attractive because small apartments were scarce. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  7 icy as a natural experiment generating an initial geographic distribution that 
was independent of characteristics unobserved to the researcher. 
The other central feature of the new refugee reception system was an intro-
duction period that lasted on average 18 months after the municipal placement 
(in many cases considerably longer). During this time the individual was not 
supposed to enter the labor market, but instead to participate in language train-
ing and other introductory activities. However, the individual had the legal 
right to enter the labor market. 
The introduction system remained largely unaltered during the period of in-
terest for this study (1987–91). One change is, however, worth mentioning. In 
1991 the system for reimbursement from the central government to the munici-
palities changed from “running expenses” to a standard amount per refugee.
8 
The idea was to increase the municipalities’ incentives to provide a quick eco-
nomic integration (see The Immigration Board 1997 for further details). 
The unexpectedly large number of immigrants increased waiting times for 
receiving residence permits. On average, those receiving resident permits in 
1987 spent about four months in Sweden pending the decision; for the 1991 
cohort the corresponding figure was more than one year. There were consider-
able differences in waiting times depending on visa category, but waiting times 
were in general longer in later cohorts also within categories (see Rooth 1999 
for a further description on waiting times and refugee categories).
 9 
 
2.2  Implications for this study 
The dramatic increase in unemployment in the early 1990s was unexpected. 
Given this and the long waiting times pending a decision on residence permits 
discussed above, it is likely that the immigrant cohorts of interest made their 
decision to go to Sweden under similar expectations about the conditions in the 
Swedish labor market. Any selection (of individuals) based on the state of the 
host country’s labor market is therefore expected to act in the same direction 
for all cohorts. Furthermore, refugees are likely to be less sensitive than other 
migrants to labor market opportunities in their decisions, since push factors 
play a central role for this group. 
                                                      
8 The standard amount was differentiated for some groups, for example for old people.  
9 The refugee categories included are: Convention, Conscientious objectors, De Facto, Quota, 
Humanitarian, and General Decision. Waiting times were especially short for quota refugees, 
who in practice received their residence permits at arrival. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  8 As the length of the introduction period indicates, labor market entry did in 
most cases not occur immediately after reception of the residence permit. The 
later the cohort arrived, the lower the number of people who could enter before 
the recession started. It seems likely that almost everybody in the 1987 cohort 
entered under favorable conditions, while this was the case for very few immi-
grants in the 1991 cohort. We will use the economic crisis as an exogenous 
force that made otherwise similar refugee groups face very different national 
labor markets. 
Our other source of exogenous variation is the refugee placement policy. 
Following previous investigations (Edin et al. 2002 & 2003), we exploit this 




Our empirical analysis is based on the FLYDATA dataset, which integrates re-
cords from the Swedish Immigration Board, the National Labor Market Board 
and Statistics Sweden.  FLYDATA contains information on all refugees and 
tied movers who received residence permits during the period 1987–91; see 
Rooth (1999) for further details. 
The subset of FLYDATA used here contains information about 46,967 
refugee immigrants (not tied movers) of working age, who received a perma-
nent visa during the period 1987–91. In this analysis we only consider refugee 
immigrants who were 19 to 55 years old when they were granted their perma-
nent residence permits. 
The refugees are followed in the different registers through 1998, which 
gives the opportunity to observe each cohort for at least seven years after the 
year of immigration. The maximum observation period is eleven years (the 
1987 cohort). Since we are interested in persistent effects of initial labor market 
conditions, we (arbitrarily) begin estimating in year t+5: five years after immi-
gration. 
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Table 1 Sample means for some variables. Standard deviations in parenthe-
ses. 
Cohort 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Age at migration  29.7 (7.6)  30.2 (7.8)  30.5 (7.7)  30.7 (7.5)  30.6 (7.5) 
Married .59 .60 .65 .67 .63 
Men .63 .63 .62 .63 .64 
Pre-immi. Edu.
10      
    <9  years .17 .19 .22 .26 .17 
  9–10 years  .18 .20 .25 .19 .11 
  High school ≤2 years  .22 .17 .16 .12 .11 
    High  school>2  years .25 .23 .20 .18 .28 
    University  <3  years .11 .11 .10  .12. .14 
  University ≥3 years   .08 .10 .08 .13 .19 
  Imputed years of sch.  11.0 (2.6)  11.1 (2.8)  10.7 (2.7)  11.0 (3.1)  12.0 (3.2) 
Country  of  origin:      
Ethiopia .10 .09 .08 .09 .10 
Somalia .00 .00 .02 .05 .12 
Romania .05 .07 .04 .01 .05 
Yugoslavia .00 .01 .02 .05 .05 
Turkey .02 .02 .03 .03 .03 
Poland .02 .01 .02 .01 .00 
Iran .48 .39 .18 .17 .16 
Iraq .04 .10 .07 .15 .15 
Lebanon .02 .03 .08 .06 .05 
Vietnam .02 .02 .02 .09 .01 
Chile    .11 .10 .21 .02 .00 
Unknown    .01 .03 .05 .06 .02 
No  citizenship .02 .03 .03 .03 .03 
Other countries  .11 .10 .15 .18 .23 
      
Waiting time (years)  .30 (.89)  .42 (.52)  .62 (.84)  .54 (.48)  1.09 (.64) 
      
No. of individuals  8,623 9,592  14,728 6,040 7,984 
Notes: Data from FLYDATA, employment sample (including those with zero earnings). All 
variables measured two years after immigration. The variables are described in the appendix. 
 
The dataset contains information on annual earnings, level of pre-
immigration education, municipality of residence, country of origin, age at mi-
gration, sex, and marital status. It also includes visa status and time spent in 
                                                      
10 The construction of FLYDATA used several means of tracing pre-immigration education, such 
as comparisons of data from the Immigration board, education registers, and telephone inter-
views. We have excluded from the sample individuals whose level of education could not be de-
termined. Including these individuals does not change the results presented in the paper. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  10Sweden waiting for a residence permit. Table 1 shows that there were only mi-
nor differences across the 1987–91 cohorts in terms of age at migration and 
gender distribution. We find slightly more variation in the fraction of married 
individuals and substantially larger differences in pre-immigration education. 
Most strikingly, the 1991 cohort (and to some extent the 1990 cohort) con-
tained a substantially higher fraction of people with university education, in 
particular longer university training. The average length of schooling differs by 
about a year between those immigrating in 1991 and those who entered Sweden 
1987–90.  
There was also a shift in source country composition over time. Iranians 
made up almost half of the 1987 cohort, Chilean refugees came primarily in 
1989, whereas people from Somalia were more common among the 1991 im-
migrants. These differences indicate the importance of controlling for educa-
tion and country of origin in the analysis. 
Table 2 below gives some descriptive statistics on the outcome variables: 
log annual earnings and employment. The employment variable is one if the 
individual had positive earnings in the particular year, zero otherwise. This is 
indeed a very generous definition of employment, and one could argue that a 
higher threshold should be used. Our main arguments for using this earnings 
limit are the following: (i) a large fraction of the sample has zero earnings, and 
there is probably a difference between having no connection to the labor mar-
ket whatsoever and working for at least some time—any other threshold is at 
least as arbitrary and it is less clear what it measures; (ii) annual earnings will 
always to some extent capture employment variation regardless of the earnings 
limit. We have also performed robustness checks using alternative thresholds; 
they are discussed in section 4. 
The average employment rates show that those who arrived to a good labor 
market worked to a much larger extent soon after immigration than did those 
who met a bad labor market. The latter immigrants, however, increased their 
employment rates steadily, whereas especially the 1987 and 1988 cohorts were 
impeded by the economic crisis of the 1990s. Average earnings among workers 
(those with positive earnings) are also higher for refugees in the earlier cohorts 
compared to the people in our sample who immigrated in the 1990s. 
The table shows that a fraction of the immigrants worked already in the year 
they received their residence permit, and in the following year more than half 
of the 1987–89 cohorts have positive earnings. This suggests that some people 
entered the labor market directly instead of only participating in the introduc-
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  11 tion program and/or that the introduction program in some cases included 
short-term subsidized employment. However, annual earnings were in many 
cases very low in the first two years; e.g. more than 60 percent of those in the 
1990 cohort working one year after immigration had annual earnings lower 
than the average quarterly earnings of a worker in the Swedish manufacturing 
industry (Nordström Skans 2002). 
 
Table 2 Earnings and employment among refugees, t–t+11. 
 Log  earnings  Employment 
ysm 87 88 89 90 91 87 88 89 90 91 
0 9.21 9.54 9.86 9.61 9.11  .23 .25 .35 .19 .07 
1 9.94  10.10  10.35 9.80 9.32  .56 .54 .55 .31 .21 
2 10.38 10.47 10.51  9.91  9.63  .75 .71 .60 .33 .28 
3 10.58 10.50 10.54  9.95  9.91  .80 .69 .54 .33 .37 
4 10.57 10.54 10.50 10.13 10.24  .75 .59 .49 .41 .44 
5 10.65 10.53 10.52 10.40 10.37  .66 .55 .51 .45 .47 
6 10.62 10.56 10.65 10.53 10.49  .61 .55 .54 .45 .49 
7 10.68 10.68 10.74 10.63 10.67  .60 .56 .53 .46 .53 
8 10.78 10.78 10.83 10.70      .61 .55 .53 .49       
9  10.87  10.84  10.94       .60  .56  .56       
10  10.93  10.99        .60  .57        
11  11.07         .62         
Notes: log earnings in 2001 prices and employment (= earnings>0) by cohort and years since 
migration (ysm). The variables are described in the appendix. 
 
Our primary geographic unit is local labor market regions. The 1993 defini-
tion of these regions divides Sweden’s municipalities into 109 regions, based 
on commuting behavior.
 Compared to municipalities, this geographic grouping 
better captures the local labor market prospects that actually faced the indi-
viduals. Especially within metropolitan areas, the possibility of commuting 
across municipalities may make municipalities a less appropriate geographic 
unit for measuring local labor market opportunities.
 11 However, we use mu-
nicipalities in a sensitivity analysis. 
                                                      
11 The category Stockholm, which is the largest local labor market area by this definition, is made 
up of twenty-nine municipalities while others are made up of just one municipality with a small 
population. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  12The analysis of the impact of the state of the national labor market requires 
a comparison group to eliminate time effects. Data for these groups have been 
taken from the LINDA database; see Edin & Fredriksson (2000) for details. 
This database is also the source of individual data for the estimations that relate 
Sweden to results from other countries (section 4.1).  
The LINDA database consists of annual information from tax records and 
population registers. There is one three-percent sample of the overall Swedish 
population, and another sample containing 20 percent of the foreign-born popu-
lation. We use a number of different samples from the database, some represen-
tative for the overall Swedish population and some samples of immigrants ar-
riving during certain periods. In section 4 we return to how we construct and 
use the samples. 
For measuring local labor market properties we primarily use annual em-
ployment statistics from Statistics Sweden and unemployment statistics from 
the Labor Market Board (Ams). We also utilize data on vacancies (Ams) and 
job creation and job destruction rates (IFAU) and unemployment data from the 




4 Empirical analysis 
We begin this section by briefly comparing patterns in Swedish data with what 
has been found for other countries in previous studies. Then we turn to analyz-
ing the impact of labor market conditions at the national level, where we com-
pare the outcomes of the 1987–91 refugee cohorts. The investigation of the im-
pact of the initial local labor market concludes the section. 
 
4.1  Relating Sweden to results for other countries 
Some previous studies (Chiswick et al. 1997; McDonald & Worswick 1999) 
indicate that meeting a bad labor market at the time of immigration may be cor-
related with higher earnings and employment rates in subsequent years.
12 This 
                                                      
12 Chiswick et al. (1997) estimate the relation between the unemployment rate at the time of en-
try and individual employment for foreign-born individuals, natives, and a pooled sample of 
these two groups. The results are of the same magnitude in all samples, although only statisti-
cally significant in the sample of natives and in the pooled sample. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  13 finding is indeed peculiar from a theoretical point of view (if not taking selec-
tive migration into account), but as a starting point it is interesting to see which 
impression we would get from a similar analysis on Swedish data. 
Table 3 presents estimates from regressions using ten cross-sections for the 
years 1990 through 1999 from the LINDA database. The dependent variable is 
either employment or log earnings, and the explanatory variable of interest is 
the national unemployment level in the year of immigration. 
The first two columns suggest quite small effects of initial labor market 
conditions. At face value, an increase in initial unemployment of one percent-
age point
13 is associated with about 1.7 percent lower earnings and half a per-
centage point lower employment probability. When we allow the effect to vary 
by immigration period (before and after 1990) we get larger effects. The esti-
mates for those who arrived prior to 1990 suggest that a one percentage point 
rise in unemployment is connected with an employment probability increase of 
2.3 percentage points and about 6.6 percent higher earnings. For the immigra-
tion in the 1990s, the corresponding unemployment variation is coupled with 
1.0 percentage points lower employment rates and 3.2 percent lower earnings. 
These results are quite mixed—just as findings from other countries. The es-
timations show that also for Sweden one could conduct an analysis where a bad 
initial labor market is associated with better outcomes, at least for some groups. 
In the next step, we can see whether this conclusion is altered when we attempt 
to control for the selection problems that are likely to influence the results of 
Table 3. 
                                                      
13 A standard deviation in the variable amounts to 1.8 percentage points. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  14Table 3 Labor market outcomes and the unemployment rate at entry, cross-
sections 1990–99. 
 Log  earnings Employment Log earnings Employment
Unemployment –.016** –.005**
 (.003) (.001)
Unemp., im. Year <1990  .066** .023**
 (.009) (.003)
Unemp., im. Year ≥ 1990  –.032** –.010**
 (.004) (.001)
Observations 475,959 701,164 475,959 701,164
R-squared .17 .17 .17 .17
Notes: Regressions of employment and log earnings (conditional on employment) on the na-
tional unemployment level (percentage of the working age population) in the year of immigra-
tion (taken from the Labor force surveys (AKU). Employment equals 1 if the individual had 
positive earnings, 0 otherwise. The regressions include controls for observation year, years since 
migration (dummy for each year), age and age squared, gender, level of education, and immi-
gration decade. Full estimation results are available upon request. The sample is restricted to 
those immigrating between 1976 and 1999, aged 19–64, and at least 18 years old at immigra-
tion. * (**) denotes significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
 
 
4.2  The national level 
This subsection compares the outcomes of the 1987–91 refugee cohorts to get a 
picture of how the state of the national labor market at the time of immigration 
influences employment and earnings. We follow individuals during three years, 
starting five years after immigration. 
Consider estimating the following model 








it c i r c
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where   is either employment or log earnings for individual i in cohort k at 
time t,   is a dummy indicating if the person is a refugee or not,  is a vector 
of individual characteristics, YSM  is a set of dummy variables indicating the 
number of years the person has spent in the host country, T are observation 
year dummy variables, and   are dummy variables for belonging to refugee 
cohort k (set to zero for the comparison group). The parameter vector   cap-
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the parameters of primary interest. 
k γ
Since we compare the outcomes in different calendar years, it is important 
to separate the general time effect   from  , i.e., to eliminate macro effects 
that would have caused different outcomes even in the absence of an effect of 
the initial labor market conditions. We add a comparison group in order to 
identify the general time effects, since 
t δ
k γ
ϕ ,  , and   cannot be identified to-
gether using only the refugee sample . The approach of eliminating contempo-
rary macro effects by assuming that they are equal among, e.g., immigrants and 
natives is common in these types of studies; see e.g. Borjas (1994). 
t δ
k γ
The problem is then to find a comparison group that captures the relevant 
macro effects. Edin et al. (2002) analyze a similar problem and find that the 
best comparison group is immigrants from non-OECD countries who arrived 
before the refugees in our sample.
14 Based on this, we use non-OECD immi-
grants who immigrated between 1975 and 1980 in our baseline analysis.
15 We 
also estimate our model with a representative sample of the native population 
as the comparison group. We will return to this in the presentation of the re-
sults. 
The model specified in (1) estimates the average difference in outcomes be-
tween cohort k and the reference cohort (1987) in the three years of observa-
tion, conditional on observed individual characteristics, time spent in Sweden, 
and the general time effect  . The approach builds on a number of important 
assumptions. First, the time effect should be the same among refugees and the 
comparison group. Second, for   to capture the effect of entering in different 
states of the labor market, this must be the only thing that separates the refer-
ence cohort and refugee cohort k (conditional on observed characteristics). The 
individual characteristics include controls for gender, age, marital status, level 
of education, and country of origin. Note also that we allow the effects of indi-
vidual characteristics to vary between refugees and the comparison group. 
t δ
k γ
                                                      
14 Edin et al. (2002) find that OECD immigrants arriving at the same time as the refugees is the 
second-best group. This alternative is, however, not appropriate in this study, since an effect of 
the initial labor market is likely to affect everybody immigrating in a particular year. 
15 For each observation year, immigrants who arrived in any year 1975–80 are included. Note, 
though, that we control for years since migration also for this group. 
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section 2, most individuals of the 1987 cohort had finished their introduction 
activities in time to enter the labor market under favorable conditions. In the 
1991 cohort on the other hand, few people entered before unemployment had 
become high or was at least rising rapidly. 
If initial conditions matter in a longer run we should therefore expect the 
1991 cohort to perform worse than those immigrating in 1987. In the interme-
diate cohorts, a falling fraction likely entered the labor market in good times. 
Therefore, we would expect a pattern of declining performance the later the 
cohort arrived. Note, though, that the hypothesis says nothing about which pe-
riod of time that actually defines “initial labor market conditions”. It could be 
that just a few months of “treatment” is enough to grant a stronger position in 
the labor market; it could also be that the individual needs a couple of years to 
become established.
16 Therefore, our priors concerning the results are not that 
clear for the 1988–1990 cohorts. 
The specifications use observations on refugees 5–7 years after immigra-
tion. If there is a persistent effect of initial conditions, it should be present in 
our data.
17 One interesting point to note is that the historical experience of 
refugee immigrants to Sweden suggests that most of the economic assimilation 
occurs within the first four years after arrival (Edin et al. 2000). If this is true 
also for the people in our sample, differences during our period of observation 
may well persist in a longer run. 
Table 4 presents our baseline estimates for the national level, using log 
earnings and employment (earnings >0) as outcomes. The estimates presented 
in the first four columns indicate that those who entered in a poor labor market 
(1991) were less likely to work five to seven years later compared to those who 
met a good labor market (1987). Also, those who did work had lower earnings 
than their predecessors. The magnitude of the estimated effects is substantial: 
7–9 percentage points lower probability to work, and 11–15 percent lower 
earnings among workers. The pattern for the intermediate cohorts is also 
roughly consistent with the underlying hypothesis. There appears to be declin-
                                                      
16 Chiswick et al. (1997) approach this problem by including averages of unemployment rates 
during the individual’s first three years in the US. 
17 We would of course like to include also a much longer perspective. Since our data only include 
observation up to and including 1998 this is impossible at present. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  17 ing performance across cohorts, and the 1990 refugees have as weak a position 
as those immigrating 1991.
18  
Why does the 1991 cohort perform at least as well as the 1990 cohort? 
There are at least two possible explanations to this result. First, most of the 
1990 cohort may not have entered the labor market before the economic crisis 
began, given an average introduction period of one and a half years. Second, as 
already mentioned, the reimbursement system from the central government to 
the municipalities changed in 1991 in a way that probably increased the incen-
tives to put people into work. 
It can be argued that neither the comparison group of 1975–80 immigrants 
nor the one containing natives capture the appropriate time effects. These 
groups have a stronger position on the labor market than the refugees, and may 
therefore not be as sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations. As a robustness 
check, we limited the comparison groups to the quartile with the lowest pre-
dicted outcomes.
19 The second panel of Table 1 shows that the results of these 
estimations are quite similar to those discussed above. 
We now proceed to discuss some additional variations and robustness 
checks. The first two columns of Table A 1 show estimates from a model with-
out general time effects (including only refugees). It seems that excluding the 
control for observation year yields a too negative picture of the performance in 
the 1988 and 1989 cohorts. Since this implies that correctly estimated time ef-
fects are important for the interpretation of the results, it is reassuring that 
Table 4 suggests the same basic pattern regardless of which group we use to 
generate these time effects. 
                                                      
18 A few notes on the statistical models are in order. The reason for not applying a selection-
correction model in the earnings specification is that we do not have access to an identifying in-
strument for the selection equation into employment. However, the results for the employment 
and earnings specifications go in the same direction. Had this not been the case, we would have 
been more worried about the interpretation of the earnings results. Since we have to control for 
general time effects, and do this in a difference-in-differences manner, the employment models 
are estimated using the linear probability model. Another issue is that there are repeated observa-
tions of individuals in the estimation samples, since we pool the data for three years of observa-
tion. To address the issue of correlated error terms, we apply the “cluster” command provided by 
the Stata software. This produces standard errors that only require independence across units—
individuals in this case—and not between multiple observations of one unit. See Statacorp (2001) 
for a further description.  
19 The predicted outcomes were obtained through regressions of the outcome variable on the in-
dividual variables mentioned in the text. The regressions were made separately for each year. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  18Table 4 The effect of initial conditions in the national labor market. 
 Overall 
Comparison Immigrants  75/80  Natives 
  Log(y) Empl.  Log(y) Empl. 
Cohort  1988  –.040 –.035**  –.051* –.049** 
  (.023) (.007) (.021) (.006) 
Cohort  1989  –.061* –.065** –.092** –.082** 
  (.026) (.008) (.020) (.006) 
Cohort  1990  –.131** –.091** –.162** –.110** 
  (.037) (.011) (.027) (.007) 
Cohort  1991  –.121** –.068** –.162** –.084** 
  (.041) (.013) (.025) (.007) 
Observations  110,507 189,923 243,528 325,690 
R-squared  .12 .11 .26 .25 
      
 Poor  predicted 
Comparison Immigrants  75/80  Natives 
  Log(y) Empl.  Log(y) Empl. 
Cohort  1988  –.042 –.040**  –.031 –.048** 
  (.027) (.006) (.021) (.006) 
Cohort  1989  –.077 –.078** –.060** –.085** 
  (.039) (.006) (.021) (.006) 
Cohort  1990  –.155** –.112** –.120** –.118** 
  (.057) (.007) (.029) (.007) 
Cohort  1991  –.166* –.098** –.115** –.098** 
  (.071) (.007) (.027) (.007) 
Observations  82,727 146,415 115,832 179,520 
R-squared  .06 .13 .12 .24 
Notes: Estimates of average differences between refugee cohorts (1987 reference), outcomes 
5–7 years after immigration. Regression models also include controls for calendar year, 
years-since-migration (dummies), a group fixed effect (refugee-comparison), and individual 
characteristics (age, age squared, gender, marital status, gender*marital status, and country of 
origin). Full estimation results are available upon request. The impact of individual charac-
teristics is allowed to differ between refugees and the comparison group. The standard errors 
are robust and clustered by individual. * (**) denotes significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  19 Studying rather than entering the labor market may have been the primary 
target of some individuals included the sample. To test if this affects the find-
ings we restricted the refugee sample to those aged at least 26 at immigration. 
Table A 1 (headings (2) and (3)) shows that the magnitude of the estimated ef-
fects is somewhat larger with this restriction. This is what one would expect to 
find if each cohort contains a similar fraction of young people that will study 
regardless of work opportunities. 
We also experimented with increasing the number of individual characteris-
tics. Specifically, we included controls for type of refugee status
20 and time 
spent in Sweden before receiving a residence permit. The latter variable does 
not exhibit much correlation with the outcome variables, but including the 
dummies for different refugee categories made the 1989 cohort look somewhat 
more similar to the 1990–91 cohorts than in the baseline estimates. However, 
the overall pattern of the findings remained. 
In section 4.3 we argue that which local labor market the individual was 
placed in may have affected outcomes. If later cohorts more often started out in 
bad locations, this could give a false impression of an impact of the state of the 
national labor market. We therefore included a set of dummies to control for 
the initial distribution over local labor markets (all variables were set to zero 
for the control group). This had virtually no effect on the estimates. 
If we alter the threshold for being classified as employed—and thereby in-
cluded in the earnings regression—from 0 to SEK 36,900 or SEK 100,000 re-
spectively
21, we get the same qualitative pattern across cohorts as in Table 4, 
but the point estimates are in general smaller the higher the threshold.
22 
Performing the analysis by gender reveals that the cohort differences are 
very similar for males and females in the refugee sample (i.e. with no control 
for the macro-effect). The results are also qualitatively the same when natives 
are used as comparison group. However, the earnings specification using 
                                                      
20 The reason for not including this variable in the baseline specification is because it is unclear 
whether individuals change their reason for applying for asylum based on changing governmen-
tal practices (to increase their probability of being granted a residence permit) or if it captures ac-
tual differences in the characteristics of applicants.  
21 Approximately 4,000 and 9,000 euros. The threshold of 36,900 is the level of the so-called 
“base amount”, which determines e.g. eligibility for social assistance. 
22 Using the higher threshold of 100,000 SEK (with the unrestricted “Immigrants 75/80” com-
parison group) the estimates for the 1990 and 1991 cohorts are –.053 (.013) and –.040 (.015) in 
the earnings specification. The corresponding employment estimates are –.041  (.010) and –
.029 (.013). 
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opment in the late 1990s differed across gender in this group. This particular 
set of estimations shows no significant cohort differences for females, but 
strong effects for males. We have no good explanation as to why the general 
time effects should be so different in these two subgroups. The effects on em-
ployment remain significant and are of the same order of magnitude as for 
males. 
There are also more fundamental questions about the empirical strategy. 
One issue concerns the potential effect of cohort size on economic perform-
ance. However, our results suggest that cohort performance does not seem to 
follow cohort size. The 1991 cohort is larger than the 1990 cohort, and pre-
sumably met worse conditions upon arrival; still, labor market performance is 
similar in the two cohorts. A similar objection is that the labor market may be-
come saturated once the stock of immigrants becomes large enough, and that 
this, rather than the economic downturn, is the factor behind our findings. Even 
though it is impossible to rule out this possibility, we are inclined to believe 
that a “saturation effect” is not responsible for a major part of the estimated ef-
fects.
23 
Another topic is our implicit assumption of no, or similar, selection of im-
migrants. One fact that signals that this may not be a big problem is the time 
pattern of refugee applications in Sweden compared to the rest of Western 
Europe and the World. In the later part of the 1980s the relative number of ap-
plications submitted in Sweden fell at the same time as the economy was 
booming. In 1992 it rose drastically despite the economic downturn in Sweden. 
If changes in relative labor market opportunities between countries were an 
important determinant of refugee destinations, this pattern would be unlikely to 
occur. 
Some researchers find that structural change explains the decline over time 
in immigrant labor market outcomes (Rosholm et al. 2001, Bevelander 2000). 
For such changes to explain our results, there has to be a very rapid structural 
change that only affects refugees and not the comparison groups. It seems 
unlikely that this is the explanation to the patterns in the data. 
                                                      
23 If one is willing to draw inference from the local to the national level, results presented in sec-
tion 4.3 support this view. We there find an effect of initial local conditions, controlling for aver-
age differences across cohorts (which eliminates saturation effects). 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  21 The results of this section show that the state of the national labor market at 
immigration matters both for employment and earnings. Cohorts that were able 
to enter and spend some time in a good national labor market perform better in 
a medium-term perspective than do cohorts who were initially exposed to a de-
clining economy. Our next step is to see if there in addition to this national ef-
fect is an impact of initial local conditions. This is the issue of section 4.3. 
 
4.3  The local level 
This section analyzes the second question posed in the introduction: the effect 
of local labor market conditions. By exploiting the governmental refugee 
placement policy as a natural experiment giving exogenous variation in initial 
locations, we investigate the effect of entering in different local labor markets. 
After a short description of the empirical models, the section presents results 
from a model including only measures of local conditions at the time of entry 
into the labor market.
 24 This model estimates the total effect of starting out in a 
bad labor market, and is probably the most interesting one from a policy per-
spective. We then present results from a model that also includes contemporary 
local conditions. The latter specification is an attempt to identify whether the 
baseline model captures scarring and/or geographic immobility. 
 
4.3.1  The empirical models 
This subsection provides a short description and discussion of our empirical 
strategy, the assumptions it rests on, and ways of testing its potential problems. 
Let us first briefly discuss the choice of local labor market variables. The study 
operationalizes local labor market conditions by the local unemployment rate. 
We have elaborated with different sets of variables, but found the unemploy-
ment rate or alternatively the non-employment rate to be the most important 
factor.
25 Other variables (vacancies, job creation and destruction rates) did not 
provide any further information when the unemployment rate was included. 
Given this and that most previous studies have used unemployment rates, we 
proxy local conditions by the unemployment rate.  
                                                      
24 Year of entry is either the year the person received a residence permit and was allowed to start 
a job, or two years later (when most people had finished their introduction programs). We will 
return to this issue below. 
25 In fact, unemployment and non-employment rates gave very similar results (when being stan-
dardized). 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  22As already mentioned, the baseline specification includes the local unem-
ployment rate at the time of labor market entry. In a second type of specifica-
tion we also include measures of contemporary unemployment, i.e., at the time 
of observation. Consider estimation of the following model 
  ij i k) j(t i k) i(t k) ij(t ε η δU γ'C β'X Y + + + + = + + +  (2) 
where   is the outcome variable for person i living in region j, k years 
after immigrating (receiving a permanent residence permit) at time t.   is 
a vector of observed individual characteristics, C  is a vector of cohort (and in 
this setup calendar time) effects, and U  is the unemployment rate in region 
j at time t+k, while  ,  , and   contain the parameters to be estimated.   is 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, and   is an idiosyncratic error term. 
k) ij(t Y +






It is clear that U  may be endogenous, i.e., correlated with  . Our ap-
proach is to instrument this variable with the current unemployment rate in the 
region of placement: U . Under which conditions is this instrument valid? 
By assumption (see discussion in section 2), placement was independent of  . 
Thus,  , i.e., there is no correlation between unobserved 
individual factors and the pre-entry local unemployment rate. This means that 
we do not have to worry about sorting into locations based on different labor 













Further, the contemporary unemployment rate in the placement region can 
be decomposed into 
 
1 1 + − + ∆ + =
k j ) (t j k) (t j
* * * U U U , (3) 
i.e., the pre-entry unemployment rate plus the change in local unemploy-
ment over time. This says that the instrument is valid unless 
; put another way, if there is an association between un-
observed factors that are not captured by the variables included in   and 
the change in local unemployment. We believe that this is only likely to be the 
case if, somehow, the inflow of refugees to a region affects the level of regional 
0 cov(
1 ≠ ∆
+ ) ,η U i k j
*
k) i(t X +
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characteristics of the refugees. 
The potential effect of the refugee inflow is probably dependent on the size 
of the inflow relative to the size of the region’s working-age population. In 
1989, the year with the highest number of residence permits, the average rela-
tive inflow was only 0.3 percent. However, the largest inflow amounted to 1.5 
percent of the region’s working-age population, which potentially could have 
had a significant impact on local unemployment.  
We have employed two strategies to investigate how the potential impact of 
the refugee inflow on unemployment could bias our results. The first method 
was to use unemployment at t–1 instead of t; the idea being that the inflow of 
refugees could not have affected time t–1 unemployment. The second method 
was to drop ten percent of the sample who were placed in regions with the 
highest relative inflow during the period 1987–91, where we expect the en-
dogeneity problems to be biggest. Both these tests yielded results very similar 
to the ones presented below. We take this as evidence that the inflow of refu-
gees did not affect unemployment rates in a way that compromises our empiri-
cal models. Hence, the local rate of unemployment at labor market entry (time 
t) is regarded as exogenous and therefore specifications using unemployment 
measures for time t are estimated by OLS. To use local unemployment rates at t 
rather than at t–1 is preferred since this is the local conditions one actually 
meets if entering the labor market directly after receipt of a residence permit.
26  
Further, it seems natural to consider labor market conditions at time t, the 
year of immigration, as a benchmark case. However, if labor market entry was 
in fact delayed by the integration plans, one would instead like to use the local 
unemployment rate at a later point in time. When the actual initial labor market 
entry occurs is not known and can therefore only be arbitrarily chosen. As men-
tioned in section 2, the integration plans on average lasted about one and a half 
years.
27 Therefore a lead of two years is used in alternative specifications; for 
example, for those who received a residence permit in 1987 we use local un-
                                                      
26 Also, if using unemployment rates at t–1 we would need to make an assumption on the persis-
tence of local unemployment rates over time since local unemployment rates in t and t–1 are not 
perfectly correlated. 
27 Rooth (2001) shows that the average time from receiving a residence permit until finding a 
first job is approximately 1.5 years for the cohort arriving in 1987 and 2 years for the cohort ar-
riving in 1991. We have experimented with leads of one and three years, and received results 
similar to those presented. 
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ployment, the local unemployment rate at t+2 might be endogenous. This prob-
lem is handled by the above-mentioned instrumental variable procedure using 
the unemployment rate at t+2 in the region of placement as an instrument. 
Therefore, all models including local unemployment rates measured in later pe-
riods than t are estimated using 2SLS. Due to the need for IV, the employment 
specifications are estimated using the linear probability model.
28 
 
4.3.2  The total effect of initial local conditions 
We now go on to present the results from the baseline models. Through the 
longitudinal nature of the data, it is possible to see how the effects of initial lo-
cal conditions develop over time, i.e. what is the medium and long-term impact 
of the local labor market one is initially placed in. It is important to discuss 
what these estimates actually capture. Since we start measuring earnings and 
employment five years after immigration, the estimates do probably not meas-
ure direct effects of initial local conditions. They are more likely to be sums of 
a number of indirect effects. One of these effects stems from a higher risk of 
having experienced unemployment if the person was initially living in a poor 
local labor market (scarring). Another comes from an increased probability of 
still living in a bad region (if bad regions tend to persist over time). The effect 
of initially being placed in a region with poor conditions that we estimate in 
this section is the sum of these indirect effects. 
Table 5 presents results from estimations of the following model 
  ij l) j(t i k) i(t k) ij(t ε δU γ'C β'X Y + + + = + + + . (4) 
The variables are the same as in (2), l is either 0 or 2, and k goes from 5 
through 10 across the columns of the table. We pool the five refugee cohorts 
together; cohort/time fixed effects are included to control for cohort differ-
ences.
29 The effect of local conditions at entry is therefore identified both from 
variation in unemployment across labor markets as well as from variation in the 
unemployment rate within labor markets over time acting beyond the average 
                                                      
28 Doing IV regressions in a non-linear context relies on the use of estimators, whose properties 
are not yet well-established (see for instance Mullahy, 1997, for an early example of such mod-
els). 
29 In a panel dataset like ours it is not possible to separately identify cohort fixed effects from 
time fixed effects. Hence, by using cohort fixed effects also time effects are controlled for.      
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30 We first report the results from the OLS estimations, i.e. using the 
local unemployment rate in the year of immigration, and then the results from 
the instrumental variable estimations, i.e., using a lead of two years for the lo-
cal unemployment rate. 
31 Note that the sample sizes decrease substantially af-
ter t+7, since fewer and fewer cohorts are included in the estimations.
32 Be-
cause of the change in sample composition, one should be cautious in interpret-
ing the development of the estimated effects over time. 
The results for earnings suggest a very stable relationship over time with the 
IV estimates being somewhat larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. The 
reason for this difference in magnitude is probably, as argued above, that the 
local unemployment rate during the first year is less important than the one in 
the third year (t+2) due to that few refugee immigrants actually enter the labor 
market within the first year.
33  
Assuming that the local labor market two years after entry is the correct 
measure of initial local labor market prospects, only the IV estimates are dis-
cussed. The results imply that a refugee that is placed in a region with one per-
centage point higher unemployment than another region suffers a 13–17 per-
cent earnings penalty, ceteris paribus. This earnings penalty also seems to be 
present in every observation period within a ten-year period from receiving a 
permanent residence permit. It should be stressed that the earnings disparities 
do not solely reflect (wage) differences across full-year workers, but also em-
ployment variation among people with at least some earnings. 
Similar results are obtained for employment outcomes. Again the IV esti-
mates are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates and imply that a refugee 
starting out in a region with one percentage point higher unemployment gives 
                                                      
30 We have experimented with a specification including both regional and cohort/time fixed ef-
fects. However, the differences in within-region variation in unemployment over time appear to 
be too small to identify any effects of initial conditions.  
31 The standard errors are corrected using the above-mentioned “cluster” command in Stata (see 
Moulton, 1990, for a discussion of problems with using aggregate explanatory variables on micro 
data). 
32 Since the cohorts only are observed until and including 1998 the estimates in t+8 to t+10 are 
not based on data including all cohorts. t+8 does not include the cohort receiving a residence 
permit in 1991, t+9 does not include the cohorts receiving a residence permit in 1990 or 1991, 
while t+10 only include the cohorts receiving a residence permit in 1987 and 1988.  
33 This interpretation is supported by the fact that OLS estimates using the local unemployment 
rate two year after entry are similar in magnitude to the IV estimates in Table 4. This fact also 
suggests that non-random relocations within the first three years is not an important issue affect-
ing the results. 
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  26him/her a 3–5 percentage point employment penalty, ceteris paribus, which 
again is persistent over time. In the period 1992–98, the difference in the local 
unemployment rate between the median person and the person at the 10
th (or 
90
th) percentile was roughly one percentage point. 
 
Table 5 The effect of initial local unemployment on log earnings and on em-
ployment. 





















  (2.8) (2.5) (2.6) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6) 
 








  (4.3) (3.7) (3.0) (2.9) (3.4) (4.9) 
        
# observations  24,636  24,417 24,416 20,278 17,633  9,995 





















  (0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) 
 








  (1.2) (1.2) (1.3) (1.9) (1.9) (2.9) 
        
# observations  46,215  45,722 45,220 37,060 30,987 17,078 
        
Share with posi-
tive earnings 
0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.59 
Notes: Table entries show estimates of the effect of local unemployment (percent) on log earn-
ings and the estimates (from a linear probability model) of local unemployment (percent) on 
the probability to be employed. Log earnings are calculated conditional on having positive 
earnings. Employment is defined as one if having positive earnings and zero otherwise. Re-
gression models also include controls for cohort/time effects and individual characteristics 
(age, age squared, gender, marital status, gender*marital status, and country of origin). Full es-
timation results are available upon request. The number of observations decreases mainly be-
cause cohorts can be followed for different periods; e.g. the 1991 cohort is included through 
T+7. * (**) denotes significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
 
As mentioned above, analyzing separate cohorts can give a picture of 
whether local labor market conditions at labor market entry matter more in a 
boom or in a recession of the economy. The 1987 and 1988 cohorts entered the 
labor market in a boom while the others entered it in a recession (if the assump-
tion of a two-year lag before entering the labor market is correct). The results 
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There is no clear order between cohorts in the magnitude of the estimates (see 
Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix). According to these results, it does not seem 
to make a difference (in the long run) whether one is being placed in a “bad” 
region in a boom or in a recession.  
The presented estimations use the unemployment rate to capture local labor 
market conditions. Since data for several years are included, this implicitly as-
sumes that one percentage point higher unemployment rate has the same effect 
in one year as in another. We have experimented with other ways of defining 
the unemployment variable: (i) relative to the average regional unemployment 
rate ( u
u j ) for each year and (ii) expressed in standard deviations of regional un-
employment for the particular year. These variations gave results that were 
qualitatively the same as those presented in the paper. 
Finally, let us briefly discuss some other robustness checks. First, two alter-
native thresholds (arbitrarily chosen) for being classified as employed were 
tested: SEK 36,900 and SEK 100,000. The effect on (log) earnings is found to 
be less negative the higher the threshold, while the opposite is true for the ef-
fect on employment.
34 Hence, the effect is to a large extent generated by the 
problems of finding stable employment in regions with high rates of unem-
ployment. 
In another specification municipalities were used instead of labor market re-
gions as geographic units. Those results show very similar effects of initial 
conditions as compared to the ones in Table 4. Following the same line of rea-
soning as in section 4.2, those less than 26 years of age at immigration were 
excluded from the sample to see whether voluntary participation in education is 
likely to affect our results. Again the results are qualitatively similar to the 
baseline case. Separate regressions for men and women also reveal similar es-
timates across gender. 
 
4.3.3  The underlying mechanisms 
In this subsection we attempt to separate the effect of contemporary local un-
employment from the effect of the local unemployment rate at entry. If initial 
unemployment has no effect when contemporary unemployment is included in 
                                                      
34 This is somewhat in contrast to the findings of section 4.2, where estimates on both earnings 
and employment tended to decrease with higher thresholds. 
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from an increased probability of remaining in a persistently bad region. Other-
wise, some type of scarring is likely to account for at least part of the effect. 
The model specification of this section adds a contemporary local unem-
ployment variable to equation 4. The contemporary local rate of unemployment 
is likely to be endogenous due to nonrandom relocations and therefore needs to 
be instrumented. This is made possible by using the local unemployment rate at 
time (t+k) in the region one was initially placed in as an instrument for the lo-
cal unemployment rate at time (t+k) in the contemporary region.
35  
The results in Table 6 are found using a specification instrumenting both the 
initial local unemployment rate at t+2 as well as contemporary local unem-
ployment. The results show that initial local unemployment rates exhibit a 
more stable correlation with earnings than do contemporary unemployment, 
while the employment specifications exhibit more mixed results. Interestingly, 
the estimated effect on earnings is in most cases larger for the initial local un-
employment rate (U at entry) rather than for contemporary unemployment. 
However, even though the simple correlation coefficient between the two local 
unemployment variables is not extremely high (somewhat less than 0.5), one 
could worry that the models are unable to separate the effects of the unem-
ployment rates in different periods.
36 Indeed, it seems odd that contemporary 
unemployment rates would not affect earnings and employment, but that local 
labor market conditions experienced several years ago would. Still, it is inter-
esting to find that the inclusion of contemporary unemployment does not 
eliminate the correlation between outcomes and past unemployment rates. 
Since the initial and the contemporary local unemployment rate variables 
have different distributions this could potentially affect our results. Therefore, 
as a robustness check, we used an alternative specification were both initial and 
contemporary local unemployment rates were standardized and mean-centered; 
the results were qualitatively the same.    
                                                      
35 Without further assumptions, the estimate of the contemporary local unemployment captures a 
local average treatment effect (LATE). Of course, the same is true for initial unemployment 
when we use the IV estimator in t+2. See e.g. Angrist & Krueger (1999) for a discussion of the 
LATE estimator. 
36 The data include 102 cross-section observations (local labor markets) observed three to nine 
years apart. 
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ings and on employment. 
  t+5  t +6  t +7  t +8  t +9  t +10 
Log earnings: 



















  (5.0) (3.7) (3.0) (4.2) (5.0) (6.4) 
 
      







  (3.3) (2.6) (3.5) (3.8) (5.6) (6.9) 
        
# observations  24,636  24,417 24,416 20,278 17,633  9,995 
        
Employment: 



















  (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.6) (1.9) (3.2) 
 
      







  (0.9) (1.0) (1.1) (1.2) (1.4) (2.1) 
        
# observations  46,215  45,722 45,220 37,060 30,987 17,078 
Notes: Table entries show estimates of the effect of initial local unemployment at t+2 (percent) 
and contemporary local unemployment (percent) on log earnings and the estimates (from a lin-
ear probability model) of the effect of initial local unemployment at t+2 (percent) and contempo-
rary local unemployment (percent) on the probability to be employed. We use the above-
mentioned instrumental variable approach to deal with endogeneity in initial as well as contem-
porary local unemployment. Log earnings are calculated conditional on having positive earn-
ings. Employment is defined as one if having positive earnings and zero otherwise. * (**) de-
notes significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
 
To conclude, local labor market conditions at arrival appear to matter for the 
success on the labor market for refugee immigrants. We find a stable long-term 
impact of which local labor market one initially enters in. There are effects 
both on the probability to work and on earnings among workers. Robustness 
checks imply that much of the effect comes from different chances to get stable 
employment rather than wage differences among full-year workers. 
Attempts to identify the underlying mechanisms suggest that the effect does 
not solely work through an increased likelihood of remaining in regions where 
unemployment is persistently high. Even though there might be issues of sepa-
rability, estimations indicate an effect of initial labor market conditions also 
when we include controls for contemporary conditions. Some sort of scarring 
effect is therefore a possible explanation at least to some part of the effect of 
initial local labor market conditions. 
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This paper investigates the effects of labor market conditions at the time of 
immigration on immigrant earnings and employment. We consider effects at 
two levels: the state of the national labor market and local conditions where 
one resides initially. 
Previous studies have been unable to handle potential problems arising from 
selective migration; i.e., individuals arriving in good times may be different 
from those arriving in bad times. Presumably, this is the factor behind findings 
implying that bad labor markets at the time of arrival could be associated with 
better long-term outcomes. 
Our analysis at the national level studies five cohorts of refugee immigrants 
who, due to an unexpected severe recession, met very different labor markets 
during their first years in Sweden. The results suggest that initial conditions 
have a substantial impact on medium-term earnings and employment. Cohorts 
where most individuals had entered before the recession are 7–9 percentage 
points more likely to be employed, and have about 12–18 percent higher earn-
ings than individuals who entered in a deteriorating labor market. 
The refugee cohorts in our sample were subjected to a placement policy in 
which the government assigned people to an initial location. We use the policy 
as an exogenous source of variation that enables us to estimate effects of initial 
local conditions. The findings go in the same direction as for the national level. 
Meeting a bad labor market at arrival leaves traces on earnings and employ-
ment for at least ten years. 
The total effect of starting out in a region with poor prospects can depend on 
two basic mechanisms: a geographic “lock-in” effect and some type of scar-
ring. According to our estimations, initial unemployment rates have an effect 
on outcomes also when contemporary regional unemployment is included 
among the regressors. This hints that the total effect is at least not fully a result 
of people remaining in persistently bad regions. 
To sum up, our results demonstrate that refugees arriving in recessions can 
be expected to have disadvantages in terms of lower earnings and employment 
for several years compared to refugees arriving in better times, who on average 
also have a weak position in the labor market. Governments often adopt poli-
cies to control the geographic distribution of newly arrived immigrants. Focus-
ing on regions with favorable labor markets could improve the odds for suc-
IFAU – Do when and where matter? Initial labor market conditions and immigrant earnings  31 cessful labor market integration and affect earnings and employment for at 
least a decade. 
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Description of variables 
 
Individual variable  Definition  Source 
    
Earnings  Sum of annual income from wage 
work or business. Deflated by the CPI 
to 2001 prices. 
FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Employment  Equals 1 if earnings>0, 0 otherwise.   
Female  Equals 1 if female, 0 if male  FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Age  Age at December 31 in the observa-
tion year. 
FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Married  Equals 1 if married, 0 otherwise  FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Education  Highest level of completed education, 
before immigration for refugees, at 
time of observation for comparison 
groups. Categories: <9 years, 9–10 
years, High school ≤2 years, High 
school >2 years, University <3 years, 
University ≥3 years. Estimations in-
clude dummies for each level. 
FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Country of origin  Birthplace. Estimations in 4.3 include 
dummies for each country. In 4.2, 
countries with less than 20 observa-
tions (in all cohorts) are defined as 
one category. 
FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Years since migration  Observation year – immigration year. 
Estimations include dummies for each 
year, set to zero for natives.  
FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Observation year  Estimations include dummies for each 
observation year. 
FLYDATA (ref.), LINDA 
(comp.) 
Refugee cohort  Dummies for refugees receiving resi-
dence permit in year x. 
FLYDATA 
Time waiting  Years in Sweden before receiving 
residence permit. 
FLYDATA 
Visa status  Refugee categories include: Conven-
tion, Conscientious objectors, De 
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Local variable  Definition  Source 
    
Local unemployment  # unemployed / pop aged 18–64  The National Labour Market 
Board (Ams) (unempl), Sta-
tistics Sweden (SCB)  (pop.) 
Local non-employment  1– (# employed / pop aged 18–64)  Statistics Sweden (SCB) 
(empl.), IFAU (pop.) 
Local vacancy rate  # Vacancies reported to the employ-
ment office / pop aged 18–64 




The sum of positive (negative) em-
ployment changes to one year from 
the previous year at the plant level 
within each region, divided by em-








Table A 1 The effect of initial conditions in the national labor market, variations. 
Group  (1) (2) (3) 
  Log(y) Empl.  Log(y) Empl.  Log(y) Empl. 
Cohort  1988  –.071** –.057**  –.046 –.037**  –.055* –.051** 
  (.021) (.006) (.027) (.008) (.025) (.007) 
Cohort  1989  –.095** –.094**  –.077* –.062** –.105** –.081** 
  (.020) (.006) (.030) (.009) (.024) (.007) 
Cohort  1990  –.137** –.123** –.147** –.093** –.181** –.116** 
  (.027) (.007) (.042) (.012) (.032) (.008) 
Cohort  1991  –.099** –.096** –.146** –.072** –.198** –.093** 
  (.025) (.007) (.046) (.014) (.031) (.008) 
Observations  73469 137157  82174 140203 187351 247723 
R-squared  .06 .09 .11 .12 .25 .25 
Notes: Robustness checks to results presented in Table 3. (1) Refugees only; (2) Age at migra-
tion>=26 Immigrants 75/80; (3) Age at migration>=26, natives. Estimates of average differ-
ences between refugee cohorts (1987 reference), outcomes 5–7 years after immigration. Re-
gression models also include controls for calendar year, years-since-migration (dummies), a 
group fixed effect (refugee-comparison), and individual characteristics (age, age squared, gen-
der, marital status, gender*marital status, and country of origin). The impact of individual 
characteristics is allowed to differ between refugees and the comparison group. The standard 
errors are robust and clustered by individual. 
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Table A 2 The effect of the local unemployment rate at entry on log earnings. 





















  (3.4) (3.4) (4.5) (3.0) (3.1) (1.7) 







  (3.4) (3.0) (3.6) (2.4) (2.4) (2.8) 





  – 
  (5.4) (3.5) (3.5) (3.0) (2.6)   





  – 
  (4.5) (3.6) (4.5) (3.6)     
Cohort 1991  –7.2
  –9.8*
  –8.9**
  – – – 
  (4.1) (3.8) (3.2)       





















  (11.1) (10.3) (19.0) (11.1) (10.7)  (8.1) 







  (12.1) (5.4) (5.4) (4.8) (6.4) (5.2) 





  – 
  (7.1) (5.8) (5.9) (4.7) (3.7)   





  – 
  (7.5) (7.0) (7.7) (6.8)     
Cohort 1991  –5.8
  –11.3**
  –11.3**
  – – – 
  (4.3) (4.0) (3.8)       
        
#  obs.  1987    5,690 5,183 5,003 5,072 4,963 4,859 
#  obs.  1988  5,159 5,137 5,214 5,054 5,053 5,136 
#  obs.  1989  7,367 7,598 7,424 7,334 7,617  – 
# obs. 1990  2,673  2,648  2,655  2,818  –  – 




      
Cohort  1987  0.66 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.60 
Cohort  1988  0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.57 
Cohort  1989  0.51 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.56  – 
Cohort  1990  0.45 0.45 0.46 0.49  –  – 
Cohort  1991  0.47 0.49 0.53  –  –  – 
Notes: Table entries show estimates of the effect of local unemployment (percent) on log earn-
ings. Log earnings are calculated conditional on having positive earnings.  * (**) denotes sig-
nificance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
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Table A 3 The effect of the local unemployment rate at entry on employment. 





















  (0.6) (1.0) (0.8) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) 







  (1.2) (1.0) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.0) 





  – 
  (0.8) (0.9) (1.1) (0.8) (0.9)   




  – – 
  (1.0) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)     
Cohort 1991  –3.7**
  –3.2**
  –2.0*
  – – – 
  (0.9) (1.0) (1.0)       





















  (1.9) (2.8) (3.4) (4.0) (4.2) (4.2) 







  (3.3) (2.2) (3.4) (3.3) (3.1) (3.0) 





  – 
  (1.6) (1.5) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6)   





  – 
  (1.9) (2.0) (2.1) (2.1)     
Cohort 1991  –4.7**
  –3.1**
  –2.9*
  – – – 
  (1.0) (1.1) (1.1)       
        
#  obs.  1987    8,557 8,473 8,384 8,306 8,234 8,142 
#  obs.  1988  9,424 9,318 9,231 9,145 9,056 8,936 
#  obs.  1989  14,383 14,199 14,047 13,863 13,697  – 
# obs. 1990  5,951  5,885  5,813  5,746  –  – 
# obs. 1991  7,900  7,847  7,745  –  –  – 
Notes: Table entries show estimates (from a linear probability model) of local unemployment 
(percent) on the probability to be employed. Employment is defined as one if having positive 
earnings and zero otherwise.  * (**) denotes significance at the 5(1)-percent level. 
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